This paper has used the Arbitrage Theorem (Gordan Theorem) to show that first, all securities are derivatives for each other, and they are priced by the same risk neutral probability measure. Second, after the firm changes its debt-equity ratio, the equityholders can always combine the new equity with other existing securities to create a home-made equity which will give exactly the same time-1 payoff of the old equity. That is, we have a capital structure irrelevancy proposition: changes in firms' debt-equity ratios will not affect equityholders' wealth (welfare), and equityholders' preferences toward variance are irrelevant. Third, when the firm moves from a more certain project to a more uncertain one, the time-0 price of equity will increase, but (because the time-1 payoff of common bond has an upper bound) the time-0 price of common bond will decrease. Fourth, different labor contractual arrangements will not affect the time-0 price of labor input. When the firm moves from a more certain project to a more uncertain one, the time-0 price of labor input will increase if it is under the share or the mixed contract.
Introduction
The seminal work of Black and Scholes (1973) has inspired many researches on pricing and hedging different financial contracts [1] . The literature argues that options and their underlying assets are different: a rise in the variability of the underlying asset will decrease its market value, but this rise will increase the market value of the option. Some studies also argue that an option value depends only on its underlying asset, and it does not depend on the random prices of other securities or portfolios. I think these arguments are wrong. In this paper, I first derive the Arbitrage Theorem, and then use the theorem to show that all securities are derivatives for each other, and they depend on each other. The paper also derives a capital structure irrelevancy proposition: changes in firms' debt-equity ratios will not affect equityholders' wealth (welfare), and equityholders' preferences toward variance are irrelevant. When the firm moves from a more certain project to a more uncertain one, the time-0 price of equity will increase, but the time-0 price of common bond will decrease. Different labor contractual arrangements will not affect the time-0 price of labor input. When the firm moves from a more certain project to a more uncertain one, the time-0 price of labor input will increase if it is under the share or the mixed contract.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 derives the Arbitrage Theorem and uses the theorem and several examples to show that securities are derivatives for each other; and that after the firm changes its debt-equity ratio, the equityholders can always combine the new equity with other existing securities to create a home-made equity which will give exactly the same time-1 payoff of the old equity. Concluding remarks appear in Section 3. If strict inequality holds, we have a contradiction to x being the closest point to y. Therefore, equality holds, and we must have 
Arbitrage Theorem and Valuation of Contracts
  '     y x y x for some λ. Since '     y x  y x , 1   . If λ = -1, then ' 2 S    x x S    t   y x x S  x  0  x for all . Letting    z y x   and t   z x , we have z t (x -x )≥ 0 and hence, t   z x S  x for each . Also, z t y - α = z t (y -x ) = -(y -x ) t (y -x ) < 0 or t   z y  n R  c n R  x m R  y m R  y n R .
Theorem 3 (Farkas Theorem):
Let A be an m × n matrix and be a vector. Then, exactly one of the following systems has a solution: System 1: Ax ≥ 0 and c t x < 0 for some System 2: A t y = c and y ≥ 0 for some Proof 1) Suppose that System 2 has a solution; that is, there exists a and y ≥ 0 such that A t y = c. Then, if for any  x 0 t t   c x y Ax such that Ax ≥ 0, then ; that is, System 1 has no solution.
2) Suppose System 2 has no solution. Form the set
. Note that the set S is a closed convex set: Let . Then there must exist such that x 1 = A t y 1 and x 2 = A t y 2 . Also,
, by Theorem 2, there exists a nonzero vector  z ' t and a scalar α such that z t c < α and 
for each y ≥ 0. Since y can be made arbitrarily large and α is a fixed number, we must have Az ≥ 0. We have therefore constructed a vector such that Az ≥ 0 and z t c < 0, i.e., System 1 has a solution.
Theorem 4 (Gordan Theorem or Arbitrage Theorem): Let A be an m × n matrix. Then, exactly one of the following systems has a solution:
System 1: Ax > 0 for some System 2: A t p = 0 for some , p ≥ 0, e t p = 1
Proof 1) Suppose that System 1 has a solution: Ax > 0 for some  x
. Then, we can construct a negative scalar δ < 0 and a vector such that Ax +δe ≥ 0, or and . 
or A t p = 0 and e t p = 1 (i.e., ).
i
In System 2 of the Arbitrage Theorem, the vector p is usually termed as the risk neutral probability measure, and p i , i = 1, ···, m, can be interpreted as the current price of one dollar received at the end of period if state i occurs. If the matrix A has rank m (i.e., the matrix has m independent rows), the risk neutral probability measure p will be unique. We now use the Arbitrage Theorem to clarify some ambiguous (and erroneous) arguments in the literature.
Example 1. All Securities Are Derivatives. Assume a one-period, two states of nature world with no transaction costs. There are a money market (Security 1) which provides 1 + 0.25 dollars at time one if one dollar is invested at time 0 (i.e., the interest rate is r = 0.25), and two other securities (Security 2 and Security 3) with current prices 4 and 500 dollars, respectively, which provide:
Note that the two securities are not governed by the same risk neutral probability measure (i.e., System 2 of the Arbitrage Theorem has no solution): 
, we cannot find a vector , 0 ≤ π ≤ 1, such that
By System 1 of the Arbitrage Theorem, arbitrage exists: e.g., at time 0, we can short sell one share of Security 3, buy 60 shares of Security 2 and invest 260 (= 500 -4 × 60) dollars in the money market, and at time 1 we can get net profit: 
Hence, in equilibrium (with no arbitrage), the time-0 prices of Security 2 and Security 3 will change so that they are priced by the same risk neutral probability messure, say, 
Suppose that two European call options are based on Security 2 (with strike price 4 dollars) and Security 3 (with strike price 650 dollars), respectively: 
C Also, at time 0, by buying n shares of the underlying asset and selling one call to construct a portfolio which gives certain time-1 payoff, the prices of the two European calls can be derived from Security 2 or Security 3:
For :
250 0.008 0 500 0.008
The time-0 price of Security 2 can be derived from Security 3 or the options, and the time-0 price of Security 3 can be derived from Security 2 or the options:
For : [2] claim that "the only random variable on which the call value depends is the stock itself. In particular, it does not depend on the random prices of other securities or portfolios" (p. 235). 1 Example 2. Home-made Securities.
In Example 1, assume that Security 3 is a firm and is the sum of five shares of equity: 
The market value of the firm (Security 3) at time 0 is still 500 dollars; that is, the market value of firm is independent of its debt-equity ratio. This is just a restatement of Modigliani-Miller's first proposition. 2 Comparing Equation (1) with Equation (2), it is found that more debt means higher variance of equity's time-1 payoff: But after the firm changes its debt-equity ratio, the equityholders can always buy only 0.6 shares of the new equity ( 0 ) and invest 40 (= 100 -0.6 × 100) dollars in the money market to recreate the time-1 payoff of the old equity ( ): 
Suppose that in Equation (2), debts are risky: 
That is, after the firm changes its debt-equity ratio, the equityholders can always combine the new equity with other securities (e.g., money market) to create a "home-made equity" which will give exactly the same time-1 payoff of the old equity. 3 We now have a capital structure irrelevancy proposition: changes in firms' debt-equity ratio will not affect equityholders' wealth (welfare), and equityholders' preferences toward variance are irrelevant. 4 This result refutes the claims in the literature that "the use of debt rather than equity funds to finance a given venture may well increase the expected return to the owners, but only at the cost of increased dispersion of the outcomes" (Modigliani and Miller, 1958 [4] , p. 262); "any gains from using more of what might seem to be cheaper debt capital would thus be offset by correspondingly higher cost of the now riskier equity capital" (Miller, 1988 , p. 100) [5] ; and "the lev-2 For a simpler proof of this proposition without using any math, see Chang (2004) [3] . 3 Note that even before the firm changes its debt-equity ratio, the equityholders can buy 3/2 shares of the existing equity ( ) and borrow 60 ( 
Suppose that the firm moves to a more uncertain project, and its time-1 payoff is
Then, Equation (4') becomes: It is found that when the firm moves from a more certain project (its time-1 payoff is either $750 or $250) to a more uncertain one (its time-1 payoff is either $900 or $100), the variance of the time-1 payoff of the firm (and the variance of the time-1 payoff of the equity) increases, the time-0 price of equity increases, but the time-0 price of debt decreases. 6 Also, this redistribution effect of wealth between debtholders and equityholders has nothing to do with their attitudes toward risk. These results and the results of Example 1 refute the claims that "there is a fundamental distinction between holding an option on an underlying asset and holding the underlying asset. If investors in the marketplace are risk-averse, a rise in the variability of the stock will decrease its market value" (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2010 [6] , p. 689); and "in most financial settings, risk is a bad thing; you have to be paid to bear it. Investor in risky (high-beta) stocks demand higher expected rates of return. High-risk capital investment projects have correspondingly high costs of capital and have to beat higher hurdle rates to achieve positive NPV. For options it's the other way around" (Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2006 [7] , p. 557).
Example 4. Pricing Convertible Bonds. In Example 2, assume Equation (2) where Security 3 is a levered firm. Assume that one of the firm's riskless debts is changed into a convertible bond: 118.75 -100) dollars. The time-0 value of the whole firm will be 570 dollars, and the time-0 value of the labor input will be 70 dollars: Example 5. Pricing Different Contracts. In Example 4, assume Equation (6) where Security 3 is a levered firm. Suppose that the firm's hiring an additional labor (a manager) can increase its time-1 payoff 
7 57 x  Share contract (where the labor's share:
; the capital providers' share: 1 50 57 
Suppose the firm moves to a more uncertain project,   and its time-1 payoff is rather than     ,  and assume that the labor is the first to get payment, the common bondholder is the second to get payment, the convertible bondholder is the third to get payment, and the equityholder obtains the residual:
Fixed-wage contract:
Mixed contract (where the labor obtains 50 dollars and has share: 3 53 y  , and capital providers' share is: 
The time-0 prices of the whole firm, the equity and the convertible bond will increase. The time-0 price of the common bond will decrease. The time-0 price of the labor input will decrease if it is under the fixed-wage contract. The time-0 price of the labor input will increase if it is under the share or the mixed contracts.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has used the Arbitrage Theorem (Gordan Theorem) to show that first, all securities are derivatives for each other, and they are priced by the same risk neutral probability measure. Second, after the firm changes its debt-equity ratio, the equityholders can always combine the new equity with other existing securities to create a home-made equity which will give exactly the same time-1 payoff of the old equity. That is, we have a capital structure irrelevancy proposition: changes in firms' debtequity ratios will not affect equityholders' wealth (welfare), and equityholders' preferences toward variance are irrelevant. Third, when the firm moves from a more certain project to a more uncertain one, the time-0 price of equity will increase, but (because the time-1 payoff of common bond has an upper bound) the time-0 price of common bond will decrease. Fourth, different labor contractual arrangements will not affect the time-0 price of labor input. When the firm moves from a more certain project to a more uncertain one, the time-0 price of labor input will increase if it is under the share or the mixed contract.
